Neural network quantization has become increasingly popular due to efficient memory consumption and faster computation resulting from bitwise operations on the quantized networks. Even though they exhibit excellent generalization capabilities, their robustness properties are not well-understood. In this work, we systematically study the robustness of quantized networks against gradient based adversarial attacks and demonstrate that these quantized models suffer from gradient vanishing issues and show a fake sense of security. By attributing gradient vanishing to poor forward-backward signal propagation in the trained network, we introduce a simple temperature scaling approach to mitigate this issue while preserving the decision boundary. Despite being a simple modification to existing gradient based adversarial attacks, experiments on CIFAR-10/100 datasets with VGG-16 and ResNet-18 networks demonstrate that our temperature scaled attacks obtain near-perfect success rate on quantized networks while outperforming original attacks on adversarially trained models as well as floating-point networks.
Introduction
Neural Network (nn) quantization has become increasingly popular due to reduced memory and time complexity enabling real-time applications and inference on resource-limited devices. Such quantized networks often exhibit excellent generalization capabilities despite having low capacity due to reduced precision for parameters and activations. However, their robustness properties are not well-understood. In particular, while parameter quantized networks are claimed to have better robustness against gradient based adversarial attacks [10] , activation only quantized methods are shown to be vulnerable [18] .
In this work, we consider the extreme case of Binary Neural Networks (bnns) and systematically study the robustness properties of parameter quantized models, as well as both parameter and activation quantized models against gradient based adversarial attacks. Our analysis reveals that these quantized models suffer from gradient masking issues [3] (especially vanishing gradients) and in turn show fake robustness. We attribute this vanishing gradients issue to poor forward-backward signal propagation caused by trained binary weights, and our idea is to improve signal propagation of the network without affecting the prediction of the classifier.
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There is a body of work on improving signal propagation in a neural network (e.g., [11, 23] ), however, we are facing a unique challenge of improving signal propagation while preserving the decision boundary, since our ultimate objective is to generate adversarial attacks. To this end, we first discuss the conditions to ensure informative gradients and resort to a temperature scaling approach [13] (which scales the logits before applying softmax cross-entropy) to show that, even with a single positive scalar the vanishing gradients issue in bnns can be alleviated achieving near perfect success rate in all tested cases.
Specifically, we introduce two techniques to choose the temperature scale: 1) based on the singular values of the input-output Jacobian, 2) by maximizing the norm of the Hessian of the loss with respect to the input. The justification for the first case is that if the singular values of input-output Jacobian are concentrated around 1 (defined as dynamical isometry [23] ) then the network is said to have good signal propagation and we intend to make the mean of singular values to be 1. On the other hand, the intuition for maximizing the Hessian norm is that if the Hessian norm is large, then the gradient of the loss with respect to the input is sensitive to an infinitesimal change in the input. This is a sufficient condition for the network to have good signal propagation as well as informative gradients under the assumption that the network does not have any randomized or non-differentiable components.
We evaluated our improved gradient based adversarial attacks on CIFAR-10/100 datasets with and ResNet-18 networks quantized using multiple recent techniques [1, 2, 4, 16] . In all tested quantized models, both versions of our temperature scaled attacks obtained near perfect success rate outperforming gradient based attacks (fgsm [12] , pgd [19] ) in their original form. Furthermore, this temperature scaling improved gradient based attacks even on adversarially trained models (both high-precision and quantized) as well as floating-point networks, showing the significance of signal propagation for adversarial attacks.
Preliminaries
We first provide some background on the neural network quantization and adversarial attacks. We then empirically show how Binary Neural Networks (bnns) tend to show fake sense of robustness and introduce modifications to existing gradient based adversarial attacks to overcome gradient masking issues in bnns.
Neural Network Quantization
Neural Network (nn) quantization is defined as training networks with parameters constrained to a minimal, discrete set of quantization levels. This primarily relies on the hypothesis that since nns are usually overparametrized, it is possible to obtain a quantized network with performance comparable to the floating-point network. Given a dataset D = {x i , y i } n i=1 , nn quantization can be written as:
Here, (·) denotes the input-output mapping composed with a standard loss function (e.g., cross-entropy loss), w is the m dimensional parameter vector, and Q is a predefined discrete set representing quantization levels (e.g., Q = {−1, 1} in the binary case). Most of the nn quantization approaches [1, 2, 4, 16] convert the above problem into an unconstrained problem by introducing auxiliary variables (w) and optimize via (stochastic) gradient descent. Specifically, the objective and the update step can be written as:
Here, P : IR m → Q m is a projection and η > 0 is the learning rate. To this end, the algorithms differ in the choice of quantization set (e.g., keep it discrete [7] , relax it to the convex hull [4] or convert the problem in to a lifted probability space [1] ), the projection used and how differentiation through projection is performed. In the case when the constraint set is relaxed, a gradually increasing annealing hyperparameter is used to enforce a quantized solution [1, 2, 4] . We refer the interested reader to respective papers for more detail.
Note that, here we have described weight quantization, however, activation quantization can be analogously formulated. In this paper, we consider bnns where the learnable parameters are constrained to the binary set {−1, 1} and activations are not quantized unless otherwise specified.
Adversarial Attacks
Adversarial examples consist of small bounded perturbations to the images that fool trained deep learning models by altering their prediction. Even though such perturbations are imperceptible to human vision, they are sufficient to alter the model's prediction with high confidence. Existing adversarial attacks can be categorized into white-box, and black-box attacks. The difference between them lies in the knowledge of the adversaries. White-box attacks allow the adversaries to have access to the target model's architecture and parameters. In the black-box threat model, the adversaries can only resort to the query access to generate adversarial samples. Since white-box gradient based attacks are more powerful and widely used, we now briefly summarize them below.
In fact, gradient based attacks can be compactly written as Projected Gradient Descent (pgd) on the negative of the loss function [19] . Formally, let x 0 ∈ IR N be the input image, then at iteration t, the pgd update can be written as:
where P : IR N → X is a projection, X ⊂ IR N is the constraint set that bounds the perturbations, η > 0 is the step size, and g t x is a form of gradient of the loss with respect to the input x evaluated at x t . With this general form, the popular gradient based adversarial attacks can be specified:
-Fast Gradient Sign Method (fgsm): This is a one step attack introduced in [12] . Here, P is the identity mapping, η is the maximum allowed perturbation magnitude, and g t x = sign (∇ x (w * ; (x t , y))), where denotes the loss function, w * is the trained weights and y is the ground truth label corresponding to the image x 0 .
pgd with L ∞ bound: Arguably the most popular adversarial attack introduced in [19] and sometimes referred to as Iterative Fast Gradient Sign Method (ifgsm). Here, P is the L ∞ norm based projection, η is a chosen step size, and g t x = sign (∇ x (w * ; (x t , y))), the sign of gradient same as fgsm. pgd with L 2 bound: This is also introduced in [19] which performs the standard pgd in the Euclidean space. Here, P is the L 2 norm based projection, η is a chosen step size, and g t x = ∇ x (w * ; (x t , y)) is simply the gradient of the loss with respect to the input.
These attacks have been further strengthened by first taking a random step as discussed in [28] and then performing projected gradient steps. In this paper, we always use this random initialization for all the attacks.
Robustness Evaluation of Binary Neural Networks
We start by evaluating the adversarial accuracy of bnns trained using various techniques, namely bc [7] , pq [4] , pmf [1] , md-tanh-s [2] , bnn-waq [15] using the pgd attack with L ∞ bound where the attack details are summarized below:
pgd attack details: perturbation bound of 8 pixels (assuming each pixel in the image is in [0, 255]) with respect to L ∞ norm, step size η = 2 and the total number of iterations T = 20. In all attacks, a randomized step is taken to initialize the perturbations as mentioned in Sec. 2.2. The attack details are the same in all evaluated settings unless stated otherwise.
We perform experiments on CIFAR-10 dataset using ResNet-18 and VGG-16 architectures and report the clean and adversarial accuracy results in Fig. 1 . It can be clearly and consistently observed that binary networks have high adversarial accuracy compared to the floating point counterparts. In fact, in some of the cases adversarial accuracy for a binary network is as close as or even better compared to the adversarially trained floating point networks. Since this result is surprising, we investigate this phenomenon further to understand whether bnns are actually robust to adversarial perturbations or they show fake sense of security due to some form of obfuscated gradients [3] .
Identifying Obfuscated Gradients
Recently, it has been shown that several defense mechanisms intentionally or unintentionally break gradient descent and cause obfuscated gradients and thus exhibit a false sense of security [3] . Several gradient based adversarial attacks tend to fail to produce adversarial perturbations in scenarios where the gradients are uninformative, referred to as gradient masking. Gradient masking can occur due to shattered gradients, stochastic gradients or exploding and vanishing gradients. We try to identify gradient masking in binary networks based on the empirical checks provided in [3] . If any of these checks fail, it indicates an issue of gradient masking in binarized neural networks.
To illustrate this, we analyse the effects of varying different hyperparameters of pgd attack on various binarized networks trained on CIFAR-10 using ResNet-18 architecture. Even though varying pgd perturbation bound does not show any signs of gradient masking, varying attack iterations and black-box vs white-box results clearly indicate gradient masking issues as depicted in Fig. 2 . Here, our black-box model to a bnn is the analogous floating point network trained on the same dataset and the attack is the same pgd with L ∞ bound.
These checks demonstrate that bnns are prone to gradient masking and exhibit a fake sense of security. Note that, shattered gradients occur due to nondifferentiable components in the defense mechanism and stochastic gradients are caused by randomized gradients due to randomly transformed input or randomly transformed network. To this end, since bnns are trainable from scratch and does not have randomized gradients 3 , we can narrow down gradient masking issue to vanishing or exploding gradients. Since, vanishing or exploding gradients occur due to poor signal propagation, by introducing a single scalar, we discuss two different approaches to mitigate this issue, which lead to almost 100% success rate for gradient based attacks on bnns.
Signal Propagation of Neural Networks
In this section, let us first describe the feed-forward dynamics of neural networks and how poor signal propagation can cause vanishing or exploding gradients. We then discuss the idea of introducing a single scalar which can improve the existing gradient descent attacks without affecting the prediction (i.e., decision boundary) of the trained models.
For notational convenience, similar to [23] , we consider a fully-connected neural network f w with weights W l ∈ IR N l ×N l−1 , biases b l ∈ IR N l−1 , pre-activations h l ∈ IR N l , and post-activations a l ∈ IR N l , for l ∈ {1 . . . K} up to K layers. Now, the feed-forward dynamics can be formulated as,
where φ : IR → IR is an elementwise nonlinearity, and the input is denoted by a 0 = x 0 ∈ IR N . Now, since softmax cross-entropy is usually used as the loss function, we can write:
where y ∈ IR d is the one-hot encoded target label and log is applied elementwise. Notice, we have subsumed the dependency of parameters into a K = f w (x 0 ) for simplicity of notation. For various gradient based adversarial attacks discussed in Sec. 2.2, gradient of the loss is used with respect to the input x 0 , which can also be formulated using chain rule as,
where ψ denotes the error signal and J ∈ R d×N is the input-output Jacobian.
Here we use the convention that ∂v/∂u is of the form v-size × u-size. Notice there are two components that influence the gradients, 1) the Jacobian J and 2) the error signal ψ. Gradient based attacks would fail if either the Jacobian is poorly conditioned or the error signal has saturating gradients, both of these will lead to vanishing gradients in ∂ /∂x 0 .
The effects of Jacobian on the signal propagation is studied in dynamical isometry and mean-field theory literature [23, 26] and it is known that a network Table 1 : Mean and standard deviation of Jacobian Singular Values (jsv) and mean ψ 2 for different methods on CIFAR-10 with ResNet-18 computed with 500 correctly classified samples. Note the norm of the error signal ψ is very small in all cases except for Adv. Train, indicating that all models are over confident (probabilities close to one-hot) except for Adv. Train which is in fact under confident for correctly classified samples. Furthermore, one can clearly see that bnns (except bnn-waq) have much higher jsv mean and we believe this leads to gradient vanishing, i.e., increased scale for logits a K and in turn reduced (if not zero) error signal ψ.
is said to satisfy dynamical isometry if the singular values of J are concentrated near 1, i.e., for a given > 0, the singular value σ j satisfies 1 − σ j ≤ for all j. Under this condition, error signals ψ backpropagate isometrically through the network, approximately preserving its norm and all angles between error vectors. Thus, just like dynamical isometry speeds up the training for the floating point networks by improving the signal propagation, a similar technique can be useful for gradient based attacks as well.
In fact, almost all initialization techniques (e.g., [11] ) approximately ensures that the Jacobian J is well-conditioned for better trainability. For continuous networks trained on the clean samples, it is hypothesized that approximate isometry is preserved even at the end of the training but this is not the case for binary networks. In fact, for bnns, the weights are constrained to be {−1, 1} and hence the weight distribution at end of training is completely different from the random initialization. Furthermore, it is not clear that fully-quantized networks can achieve well-conditioned Jacobian, which guided some research activity in utilizing layerwise scalars (either predefined or learned) to improve bnn training [20, 25] . We illustrate the signal propagation properties of various networks in Table 1 .
We would like to point out that the focus of this paper is to improve gradient based attacks on already trained bnns. To this end learning a new scalar to improve signal propagation at each layer is not useful as it can alter the decision boundary of the network and thus cannot really be used in practice on already trained model.
Temperature Scaling for better Signal Propagation
In this paper, we propose to use a single scalar per network to improve the signal propagation of the network using temperature scaling. In fact, one could replace softmax with a monotonic function such that the prediction is not altered, however, we will show in our experiments that a single scalar with softmax has enough flexibility to improve signal propagation and yields almost 100% success rate with pgd attacks. Essentially, we can use a scalar, β > 0 without changing the decision boundary of the network by preserving the relative order of the logits. Precisely, we consider the following:
Here, we write the softmax output probabilites p as a function of β to emphasize that they are the softmax output of temperature scaled logits. Now since in this context, the only variable is the temperature scale β, we denote the loss and the error signal as functions of only β. With this simplified notation the gradient of the temperature scaled loss with respect to the inputs can be written as:
Note that β affects the input-output Jacobian linearly while it nonlinearly affects the error signal ψ. To this end, we hope to obtain a β that ensures the error signal is useful (i.e., not all zero) as well as the Jacobian is well-conditioned to allow the error signal to propagate to the input.
We acknowledge that while one can find a β > 0 to obtain softmax output ranging from uniform distribution (β = 0) to one-hot vectors (β → ∞), β only scales the Jacobian. Therefore, if the Jacobian J already has zero singluar values, this temperature scaling approach would not make any difference in those dimensions. However, since most of the modern networks consist of ReLU nonlinearites, the effect of this single scalar would be equivalent (ignoring the biases) to having a single positive scalar in each layer such as in [20] . In fact this is true for all functions φ : IR → IR such that φ(ch) = cφ(h) for c > 0. To this end, we believe a single scalar is sufficient for our purpose.
Improved Gradients for Adversarial Attacks
In this section we discuss strategies to choose a scalar β such that the gradients with respect to input are informative. Let us first analyze the effect of β on the error signal. To this end, we can write
where y is the one-hot encoded target label, and p(β) is the softmax output of temperature scaled logits. Note that, for adversarial attacks, we only consider the correctly classified images (i.e., argmax j y j = argmax j p j (β)) as there is no need to generate adversarial examples corresponding to misclassified samples. From the above formula, it is clear that when p(β) is one-hot encoding then the error signal is 0. This is one of the reason for vanishing gradient issue in bnns. Even if this does not happen for a given image, one can increase β → ∞ to make this error signal 0. Similarly, when p(β) is the uniform distribution, the norm of the error signal is at the maximum. This can be obtained by setting β = 0. However, this would also make ∂ (β)/∂x 0 = 0 as the singular values of the input-output Jacobian would all be 0. Refer to Eq. (8). To understand how error signal is affected by β please refer to Fig. 3 .
This analysis indicates that the optimal β cannot be obtained by simply maximizing the norm of the error signal and we need to balance both the Jacobian as well as the error signal. To summarize, the scalar β should be chosen such that the following properties are satisfied:
2. The input-output Jacobian β J is well-conditioned, i.e., the singular values of β J is concentrated around 1.
We now discuss two approaches to obtain a β that alleviates vanishing gradients such that already existing gradient based attacks (fgsm, pgd) can be made more effective.
Network Jacobian Scaling (njs)
We now discuss a straightforward, two-step approach to attain the aforementioned properties. Firstly, to ensure βJ is well-conditioned, we simply choose β to be the inverse of the mean of singular values J. This guarantees that the mean of singular values of βJ is 1. Formally, let us choose M samples from the test set, we can derive β as follows:
where µ j (J i ) denotes j th singular value of the Jacobian J i corresponding to the i th sample. This simple strategy not only ensures the network Jacobian singular values to J be scaled to closer to 1 but also ensures the network outputā K to be scaled down if the network is overconfident (network produces very large logits) or scaled up if the network is underconfident (network produces very small logits) which in turn improves signal propagation of ∂p(β)/∂ā K .
After this Jacobian based scaling, there can be a situation where the error signal is very small. To ensure that ψ(β) 2 > ρ > 0, we ensure that the softmax output p k (β) corresponding to the ground truth class k is at least ρ away from 1.
We now state it as a proposition to derive β given a lowerbound on 1 − p k (β).
This is derived via a simple algebraic manipulation of softmax. Please refer to Appendix A.1.
This β can be used together with the one computed in Eq. (10) . We provide the pseudocode for our proposed pgd++ attack with njs scaling in Algorithm 1. Similar approach can also be applied for fgsm++. Hessian Norm (c) Fig. 3 : Plots to show how variation in β affects (a) error signal ψ(β), (b) Jacobian of softmax, i.e., ∂p(β)/∂ā K by taking a random correctly classified logits and (c) Hessian norm ∂ 2 (β)/∂(x 0 ) 2 on a random correctly classified image. Notice that, while ψ(β) and jsv of ∂p(β)/∂ā K behave similarly, Hessian clearly shows a concave behaviour and the maximum point occurs at a small value where both ψ(β) and ∂p(β)/∂ā K are non zero. Hessian is computed for md-tanh-s network on CIFAR-10, ResNet-18 and the mean jsv of J = ∂a K /∂x 0 for this image is 45.14. Therefore the input-output Jacobian β J has the mean jsv around 2.5.
β1 computed using Network Jacobian. 2:
Random Initialization with Projection 3: for t ← 1, . . . T do 4: β2 = 1.0 5: p = softmax(β1(fw * (x t ))) 6:
if 1 − p k ≤ ρ then ρ = 0.01 7: β2 = − log(ρ/(d − 1)(1 − ρ))/γ γ computed using Proposition 1 8:
= −y T log(softmax(β2β1(fw * (x t )))) 9:
x t+1 = P ∞ (x t + η sign(∇x (x t ))) Update
Step with Projection Notice that, this approach is simple and it adds negligible overhead to the standard pgd attacks. However, it has a hyperparameter ρ which is hand designed. To mitigate this, next we discuss a hyperparameter-free approach to obtain β.
Hessian Norm Scaling (hns)
We now discuss another approach to obtain informative gradients. Our idea is to maximize the Frobenius norm of the Hessian of the loss with respect to the input, where the intuition is that if the Hessian norm is large, then the gradient ∂ /∂x 0 is sensitive to an infinitesimal change in x 0 . This means, the infinitesimal perturbation in the input is propagated in the forward pass to the last layer and propagated back to the input layer without attenuation (i.e., the returned signal is not zero), assuming there are no randomized or non-differentiable components in the network. This clearly indicates that the network has good signal propagation Algorithm 2 pgd++ with hns with L ∞ , T iterations, radius , step size η, network f w * , input x 0 , label k, one-hot y ∈ {0, 1} d , gradient threshold ρ.
= −y T log(softmax(β * (fw * (x t )))) 5:
Step with Projection as well as the error signals are not all zero. This objective can now be written as:
The derivation is provided in Appendix A.2. Note, since J does not depend on β, J and ∂J/∂x 0 are computed only once, β is optimized using grid search as it involves only a single scalar. In fact, it is easy to see from the above equation that, when the Hessian is maximized, β cannot be zero. Similarly, ψ(β) cannot be zero because if it is zero, then the prediction p(β) is one-hot encoding (Eq. (9)), consequently ∂p(β)/∂ā K = 0 and this cannot be a maximum for the Hessian norm. Hence, this ensures that ψ(β * ) 2 > ρ for some ρ > 0 and β * is bounded according to Proposition 1. Therefore, the maximum is obtained for a finite value of β. Even though, it is not clear how exactly this approach would affect the singular values of the input-output Jacobian (β J), we know that they are finite and not zero. To better understand how the error signal, Jacobian of softmax and Hessian norm are influenced by β, we provide an example illustration in Fig. 3 . Nevertheless, there are some recent works [21, 24] show that adversarial training makes the network (in fact the loss ) linear and they hypothesize that linear networks would be robust to adversarial attacks. On the contrary, our idea of maximizing the Hessian, i.e., increasing the nonlinearity of , could make the network more prone to adversarial attacks and we intend to exploit that. Our improved pgd attack using this Hessian based scaling is summarized in Algorithm 2.
Related Work
Neural Network Quantization. Recent works on nn quantization has been focused on different aspects such as quantizing parameters [1, 2, 4, 7] , gradients [29] , loss aware quantization [14] , and quantization for specialized hardware [8] , to name a few. Note that, parameter quantization methods trivially extend to quantization of activations and/or gradients [15, 29] . Parameter quantization is usually formulated as a constraint optimization and minimized via a modified version of projected stochastic gradient descent. In this, the works [1, 2, 4, 7] vary based on the constraint set, the projection used and the procedure used for backpropagation through the projection operator. In this work, we only study the robustness evaluation of recent quantization methods on the extreme case of binarization and we believe it extends to multibit quantization as well.
Adversarial Attacks and Robustness of Binary Networks. Adversarial examples are first observed in [27] and subsequently efficient gradient based attacks such as fgsm [12] and pgd [19] are introduced. There exist recent stronger attacks such as [6, 9] , however, compared to pgd, they are much slower to be used for adversarial training in practice. Some recent works focus on adversarial robustness of bnns [5, 10, 17, 18] , however, a strong consensus on the robustness properties of quantized networks is lacking. In particular, while [10] claims parameter quantized networks are robust to gradient based attacks based on empirical evidence, [18] shows activation quantized networks are vulnerable to such attacks and proposes a defense strategy assuming the parameters are floatingpoint. Differently, [17] proposes a combinatorial attack hinting that activation quantized networks would have obfuscated gradients issue. In short, although it has been hinted that there might be some sort of gradient masking in bnns (especially in activation quantized networks), a thorough understanding is lacking on whether bnns are robust, if not what is the reason for inferior performance of gradient based attacks on binary networks. We answer this question in this paper and introduce improved pgd attacks.
Experiments
In this section, we evaluate floating point networks (ref), parameter quantized networks (bc, pq, pmf, md-tanh-s) [7, 4, 1, 2] and weight and activation quantized network (bnn-waq) [16] . Note that, while all the parameters are binarized in bc, pmf and md-tanh-s, pq and bnn-waq are binarized according to the original setup where biases, batchnorm and last layer parameters are kept floating-point. We evaluate our two pgd++ variants corresponding to Hessian Norm Scaling (hns) and Network Jacobian Scaling (njs) on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 datasets with VGG-16 and ResNet-18 architectures. Briefly, our results indicate that both of our proposed attack variants yield attack success rate much higher than original pgd attacks not only on L ∞ bounded attack but also on L 2 bounded attacks on both floating point networks and binarized networks. Our proposed pgd++ variants also reduce pgd adversarial accuracy of adversarially trained floating point and adversarially trained binarized neural networks. Among our variants, even though they perform similarly in our experiments, Hessian based scaling (hns) outperforms Jacobian based scaling (njs) in most of the cases and this difference is significant for one step fgsm attacks. This indicates that nonlinearity of the network indeed has some relationship to its adversarial robustness.
We use the state of the art models trained for binary quantization from respective methods. For our hns variant, we sweep β from a range such that the hessian norm is maximized for each image, as explained in Appendix B. For our njs variant, we set the value of ρ = 0.01. In fact, our attacks are not very Table 3 : Adversarial accuracy on the test set for binary neural networks using different methods for quantization using original fgsm attack and fgsm++ attack with njs and hns.
sensitive to ρ and we provide the ablation study in the Appendix. Our algorithm is implemented in PyTorch [22] and the experiments are performed on NVIDIA Tesla-P100 GPUs. Our code will be released upon publication.
L ∞ bounded Attacks. Attack details are: CIFAR-10: perturbation bound of = 8 pixels, step size η = 2 and number of iterations T = 20, CIFAR-100: perturbation bound of = 4 pixels, step size η = 1 and number of iterations T = 10. We tested the original pgd as well as both versions (njs and hns) of improved pgd++, on CIFAR-10/100 datasets with ResNet-18 and VGG-16 networks and the adversarial accuracies are reported in Table 2 . Our pgd++ variants consistently outperform original pgd on all binarized networks. Even being a gradient based attack, our proposed pgd++ variants can in fact reach adversarial accuracy close to 0 on CIFAR-10 dataset, demystifying the fake sense of robustness binarized networks tend to possess due to poor signal propagation. Similarly, fgsm attack (η = 8.0 on CIFAR-10 and η = 4.0 on CIFAR-100) accuracies are reported in Table 3 . Even in this one step attack, our modified versions perform well. We would like to point out such an improvement in above two attacks is considerably interesting, knowing the fact that fgsm, pgd with L ∞ attacks only use the sign of the gradients so improved performance indicate, our temperature scaling indeed makes some zero elements in the gradient nonzero.
L 2 bounded Attacks. For L 2 bounded attacks the number of iterations are the same as L ∞ case, but η = 15 and = 120 for CIFAR-10 and η = 15, and = 60 for CIFAR-100 and the results are reported in Table 4 . Similar to the L ∞ case, our variants consistently outperform standard L 2 bounded pgd attack on all the binarized networks. Particularly interesting, our pgd++ variants not only performs well on floating point networks but also even improve the adversarial attack success rate on them. This effectively expands the applicability of our pgd++ variants and encourages to consider signal propagation of any trained network to improve gradient based adversarial attacks.
Adversarially trained models. To further demonstrate the efficacy, we first adversarially trained the parameter quantized networks and floating point networks in a similar manner as in [19] , using L ∞ bounded pgd with T = 7 iterations, η = 2 and = 8. We then evaluate the adversarial accuracies using L ∞ bounded pgd and pgd++ attack with T = 20, η = 2, = 8 on CIFAR-10 dataset using ResNet-18 and the results are reported in Table 5 . The adversarial accuracy results on adversarially trained binary and floating point networks further strengthens the usefulness of our proposed pgd++ variants.
Discussion
In this work, we have shown that both parameters quantized and parameters along with activation quantized networks tend to show a fake sense of robustness on gradient based attacks due to poor signal propagation. To tackle this issue, we introduced our two variants of pgd++ adversarial attack, namely njs and hns. Our proposed pgd++ variants not only possess near-complete success rate on binarized networks but also outperform standard L ∞ and L 2 bounded pgd attacks on floating-point networks. Since pgd has become a standard attack for adversarial training, our stronger pgd++ variants could provide a future scope of extending proposed pgd++ for improved robustness. In future, we also intend to focus more on improving the robustness of the binarized neural networks.
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Appendices
Here, we first provide the proof of the proposition and the derivation of Hessian. Later we give additional experiments and the details of our experimental setting.
A Derivations
A.1 Deriving β given a lowerbound on 1 − p k (β) Proposition 2. Let a K ∈ IR d with d > 1 and a K 1 ≥ a K 2 ≥ . . . ≥ a K d and a K 1 − a K d = γ. For a given 0 < ρ < (d − 1)/d, there exists a β > 0 such that
Since, a K 1 − a K λ ≤ γ for all λ > 1,
Therefore, to ensure 1/ 1 + d λ=2 exp(β(a K λ − a K 1 )) < 1 − ρ, we consider,
Therefore for any β < − log(ρ/(d − 1)(1 − ρ))/γ, the above inequality 1 − softmax(βa K 1 ) > ρ is satisfied.
A.2 Derivation of Hessian
We now derive the Hessian of the input mentioned in Eq. (11) of the paper. The input gradients can be written as:
Now by product rule of differentiation, input hessian can be written as:
B Additional Experiments
In this section we first provide experimental details of our hns variant of pgd++ and then some ablation studies.
Methods pgd++ (njs) ρ = 1e − 05 ρ = 1e − 04 ρ = 1e − 03 ρ = 1e − 02 ρ = 1e − 01 ρ = 2e − 01 ref 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 bc [7] 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 pq [4] 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 pmf [1] 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 md-tanh-s [2] 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 bnn-waq [15] 0.15 0.08 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.02 Table 6 : Adversarial accuracy on the test set for binary neural networks with different methods for quantization using L ∞ bounded pgd++ attack using njs with varying ρ. For different values of ρ, our approach is quite stable.
B.1 Experimental Details for hns
For pgd++ with hns variant, we maximize Frobenius norm of Hessian with respect to the input as specified in Eq. (11) of the paper by grid search for the optimum β. We would like to point out that since only ψ(β) and p(β) terms are dependent on β, we do not need to do forward and backward pass of the network multiple times during the grid search. This significantly reduces the computational overhead during the grid search. We can simply use the same network outputs a K and network jacobian J (as computed without using β) for the grid search, while computing the other terms at each iteration of grid search. We apply grid search to find the optimum beta between 100 equally spaced intervals of β starting from β 1 to β 2 . Here, β 1 and β 2 are computed based on Proposition 1 in the paper where ρ = 1e − 72 and ρ = 1 − (1/d) − (1e − 2) respectively, where d is number of classes and γ = a K 1 − a K 2 so that 1 − softmax(βa K 1 ) < ρ. Also, note that we estimate the optimum β for each test sample only at the start of the first iteration of an iterative attack and then use the same β for the next iterations.
B.2 Stability of pgd++ with njs with variations in ρ
We perform ablation studies with varying ρ for pgd++ with njs in Table 6 for CIFAR-10 dataset using ResNet-18 architecture. It clearly illustrates that our njs variant is quite robust to the choice of ρ as we are able to achieve near perfect success rate with pgd++ with different values of ρ. As long as value of ρ is large enough to avoid one-hot encoding on softmax outputs (in turn avoid ψ(β) to be zero) of correctly classified sample, our approach with njs variant is quite stable.
B.3 Signal Propagation and Input Gradient Analysis using njs and hns
We first provide an example illustration in Fig. 4 to better understand how the input gradient norm i.e., ∂ (β)/∂x 0 2 , and norm of sign of input gradient, i.e., sign(∂ (β)/∂x 0 ) 2 is influenced by β. It clearly shows that both the plots have a concave behavior where an optimal β can maximize the input gradient. Also, it can be quite evidently seen in Fig. 4 (b) that within an optimal range of β, gradient vanishing issue can be avoided. If β → 0 or β → ∞, it changes all the values in input gradient matrix to zero and inturn sign(∂ (β)/∂x 0 ) 2 = 0.
We also provide the signal propagation properties as well as analysis on input gradient norm before and after using the β estimated based on njs and hns in Table 7 . For binarized networks as well floating point networks tested on CIFAR-10 dataset using ResNet-18 architecture, our hns and njs variants result in larger values for ψ 2 , ∂ (β)/∂x 0 2 and sign(∂ (β)/∂x 0 ) 2 . This reflects the efficacy of our method in overcoming the gradient vanishing issue. It can be also noted that our variants also improves the signal propagation of the networks by bringing the mean jsv values closer to 1.
B.4 Ablation for ρ vs. pgd++ accuracy
In this subsection, we provide the analysis on the effect of bounding the gradients of the network output of ground truth class k, i.e. ∂ (β)/∂ā K k . Here, we compute β using Proposition 1 for all correctly classified images such that 1−softmax(βa K k ) > ρ with different values of ρ and report the pgd++ adversarial accuracy in Table 8 . It can be observed that there is an optimum value of ρ at which pgd++ success rate is maximized, especially on the adversarially trained models. This can also be seen in connection with the non-linearity of the network where at an optimum value of β, even for robust (locally linear) [21, 24] networks such as adversarially trained models, non-linearity can be maximized and better success rate for gradient based attacks can be achieved. Our hns variant essentially tries to achieve the exact same objective while trying to estimate β for each example. Orig. 5.55e+01 5.54e+01 5.48e+01 5.48e+01 4.99e+01 4.39e+01 5.55e+01 njs 5.55e+01 5.54e+01 5.55e+01 5.55e+01 5.55e+01 5.55e+01 5.55e+01 hns 5.55e+01 5.54e+01 5.55e+01 5.55e+01 5.55e+01 5.55e+01 5.55e+01 Table 7 : Mean and standard deviation of Jacobian Singular Values (jsv), mean ψ 2 , mean ∂ /∂x 0 2 and mean sign(∂ /∂x 0 ) 2 for different methods on CIFAR-10 with ResNet-18 computed with 500 correctly classified samples. Note here for njs and hns, jsv is computed for scaled jacobian i.e. βJ. Also note that, values of ψ 2 , ∂ (β)/∂x 0 2 and sign(∂ (β)/∂x 0 ) 2 are larger for our njs and hns variant (for most of the networks) as compared with network with no β, which clearly indicates better gradients for performing gradient based attacks. Table 8 : Adversarial accuracy on the test set for adversarially trained networks and binary neural networks with different methods for quantization using L ∞ bounded pgd++ attack with varying ρ as lower bound on the gradient of network output for ground truth class k. Here * denotes the adversarially trained models obtained where adversarial samples are generated using L ∞ bounded pgd attack with with T = 7 iterations, η = 2 and = 8. Note, here pgd++ attack refers to pgd attack where ∂ (β)/∂ā K k is bounded by ρ for each sample, where k is ground truth class.
